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Abstract. This work’s motivation is to evaluate an information’s cer-
tainty based on a confirmation criterion and weighted by its source’s
credibility. To simplify matters in order to keep this paper legible, we
will suppose we have an incoming flow of information, each of which is
either a confirmation of a known information, a contradiction of a known
information or is unknown. With each piece of information an external
estimation of its source’s credibility will be given. Due to the uncertainty
regarding the evolution of information certainty and that of its source’s
credibility, we have chosen to represent both in a multi-valued logics for-
malism. In this way, the constraints we will put on credibility evolution
will be expressed in the same formalism as the actual evolution.
Key words: Information likelihood, multi-valued logic, uncertainty, trust,
information fusion
1 Introduction
The application we are working on aims at giving a certainty score to information
of different types and from various sources. The bias for calculating an informa-
tion’s certainty is that if it has been confirmed by other sources, it is probably
more likely to be true. However, we would like to refine this idea and integrate
a moderation with respect to the estimated trustworthiness of the information’s
source. This trustworthiness is an existing information and we believe that the
more you trust someone, the more likely you are to believe what that person
tells you. From this basic human tendency and using the information at hand,
we wish to build a model that will favour trusted sources yet consider others as
well.
Since we will be, in effect, calculating a confirmation score, we will need to
compare incoming information. The actual comparison is beyond the reach of
this paper, but if one considers that the sources are different and differently
rated, that each source may give information of a different type than that al-
ready known, that the considered information may well confirm or disclaim the
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information of interest but might do this only ‘to some extent’ one immediately
sees how the data we wish to evaluate, to say nothing of the evaluation itself,
is extremely uncertain. In addition to this, evaluating a source’s trustworthiness
is also another potential cause for uncertainty. This explains why we have cho-
sen to express our work in a multi-valued logics framework. Using the existing
interpretation [2, 3] which states that x is vαA ⇔ “x is A” is τα–true. In our
problem this will be interpreted as both ‘Information i is likely is τα–true’ and
as ‘Information i’s source is trustworthy is τα–true’. The actual meaning of ‘τα–
true’ will be briefly recalled in the next section. Section 2 will also introduce the
notation we have chosen to express our model.
In section 3, we will start by introducing the principles of our algorithm
(§3.1), and go on to show a more formal description in §3.2.
The following section, section 4, will discuss what we think our formalism
represents and allows in terms of cognitive posture.
Finally in section 5 we will conclude this paper and offer some thoughts on
our future works.
2 Multi-valued formalism
We shall be reasoning in a multi-valued logics formalism. This implies that we
give ourselves a totally ordered scale of truth degrees, LM = {τ0, . . . , τM−1}.
LM is said to be totally ordered because τi 6 τj ⇔ i 6 j. This scale ranges from
τ0 which is considered to be ‘false’ to τM−1 or ‘true’, intermediate τα’s values in
between, such as ‘possibly true’ and the like.
Multi-valued scales, and hence qualitative degrees, offer a good way of mod-
elling uncertain, ill-defined or poorly appraisable knowledge, something like
Zadeh’s linguistic variables did [1]. Other works have added tools to reason on
these uncertain values. Among these Darwiche and Ginsberg, Seridi and Akdag
[4, 5] have built operators to combine intermediate truth values, and therefore
model evolving cognitive processes. Following in Zadeh’s footsteps, Truck, Akdag
and others [6, 9, 10] construct symbolic modifiers and other generalisations of
useful operands.
To model the evolution of our belief scores, we need to use operations on truth
degrees. We will use those defined by Seridi and Akdag in [7] using ÃLukasiewicz’s
implication, defined in a multi-valued context by:
τα →L τβ = min(τM−1, τM−1−(α−β))
Notation
K, in figure 1, represents the set of all known information.
i ∈ K represents information i and any ulterior information confirming i.
τ(i) ∈ LM is the current evaluation of information i’s certainty.
Terms denoted using the letter κ, in general, refer to the evaluation of a source’s
trustworthiness. In particular κτi+ ∈ LM is the current advancement in informa-
tion τ(i)’s progression to the superior level, as κτi− ∈ LM is τ(i)’s progression
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to the inferior mark, if any. Also, κτβτα represents the threshold set to get i’s
credibility from τα to τβ .
3 Algorithm
We want combined source-credibility to moderate the evolution information-
score. Therefore the evolution of the truth degree of an information i, will be of
the form illustrated in figure 1 and detailed hereafter.
τ2
κτi− > κ
1
2
κτi− > κ
2
3
κτi− > κ
3
4κτi− > κ
0
1
κτi+ > κ
2
1
κτi+ > κ
3
2
κτi+ > κ
4
3κτi+ > κ
1
0
τ3τ1τ0 τ4
i /∈ K
Fig. 1. UML-like state diagram, representing the evolution of i’s likelihood and the
various thresholds on the way in L5. Note that there is no end-state.
3.1 Principle
We suppose, for legibility’s sake, that we have a flow of information which either
confirms a previously known information, contradicts it or is as yet unknown.
Any such information will be denoted i hereafter, whether it be the original
information or any other confirming it. Any contradicting information will be
noted ¬i. We will suppose, for the time being, that an information confirms –
or contradicts – another fully.
Now, suppose a κj-trustworthy (κj ∈ LM ) source gives us a new information
i. As would any new information, i will be initially rated at the middle of our
scale, to represent an uncertainty about its likelihood. What we want the process
to do next is to have sufficient confirmation to go on to the next level of likelihood.
We also wish to favour trusted sources over unknown or untrustworthy ones. For
τ(i) to move on to ADD(τ(i), τ(1)), i.e. a one-step increase in i’s likelihood
(resp. SUB(τ(i), τ(1)), a one-step decrease in i’s likelihood ) in the case of a
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confirmation (resp. contradiction), we will therefore require κτi+ (resp. κτi−) to
reach a certain threshold κADD (τ(i),τ(1))τ(i) (resp. κ
SUB (τ(i),τ(1))
τ(i) ). Note that ADD
and SUB are defined in the following section, §3.2.
The choice of parameters and its implications will be discussed in section 4.
3.2 Formal representation
To clarify the above described algorithm, the following representation describes
each step along the way. Note that as long as we receive either a confirmation or
a negation of a given piece of information i, we will loop through this algorithm.
Obviously, if either end of the scale has been reached the progression in the
corresponding direction will not evolve, but no information is permanently rated.
– Suppose we learn information i from a source whose trustworthyness is esti-
mated at κj ∈ LM
• If i /∈ K, then
∗ τ(i) = τM
2∗ κτi+ = κj
• Otherwise,
∗ κτi+ = ADD(κτi+, κj)
• If κτi+ > κτ(i)+1τ(i) then
∗ τ(i) = ADD(τ(i), τ1) = ¬τ(i)→L τ1
∗ κτi+ is undefined
∗ κτi− is undefined
– Suppose, now, we learn information ¬i with a given source-credibility κj ∈ LM
• Since i ∈ K, then
∗ κτi− = ADD(κτi−, κj)
• If κτi− > κτ(i)τ(i)−1 then
∗ τ(i) = SUB(τ(i), τ1) = ¬(τ(i)→L τ1)
∗ κτi− is undefined
∗ κτi+ is undefined
4 Discussion
In this section, we will discuss the different parameters of our algorithm and
their respective influence and range. We will then explain what we believe these
parameters allow us to model and how.
First, we must note that we suggest to rate both information likelihood and
source trustworthiness on the same scale LM . Obviously, this is possible only
if the steps needed to distinguish different levels of trust are compatible with
those required by the plausibility rating. That is to say that if we decide to
rate source credibility on, say, a seven level scale (i.e. L7), then there have to be
seven steps in likelihood as well. The same consequence applies to the thresholds
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κ
τβ
τα . We could, of course, distinguish the two scales, since they only relate the
granularity of truth we are allowing and because likelihood and trustworthiness
are never compared nor combined. We have chosen to express both on the same
scale to insist on the fact that they are truth values, distinct from the objects
they relate to. However, whether both scores are evaluated on the same scale
or not, it is important to note that they differ in interpretation. In fact the
two factors differ in nature. κτi± is an accumulated local evaluation of source
credibility, whereas τ(i) is an evolved evaluation on one information. When an
information is rated from ‘impossible’ to ‘certain’ through ‘highly unlikely’ and
the like, the aggregated credibilities of different sources cannot really be read as
anything. However each credibility score, taken on its own, may well be anything
from ‘untrustworthy’ to ‘completely trustworthy’, scaling through all and many
degrees on the way.
The most important part of our method is the setting of the thresholds. We
think that by not imposing any symmetry on κτβτα and κτατβ we can model different
psychological postures. Indeed, we say that one way of modelling a suspicious
character is to favour downard evolution over upward progression. Suppose that
it would take three confirmations to get from ‘possibly true’ to ‘quite likely’, the
next step up, and only two to go the other way. We think that this is typical
of a mistrustful psychology. If, in addition to this, we fix the step down from
‘possibly true’ to ‘probably not true’ to two contradictions, we have a very hard
to convince person. The fact that this probably increases the potential number
of cycles in the evaluation of an information’s likelihood is not a problem, since,
by construction, there is no end state. As long as confirmations or contradictions
keep on coming, the credibility will keep on evolving, whatever the settings. The
main consequence of having unequal thresholds is that the order of arrival of
the information is important. We also think that, in a debate for instance, the
order and the timing of arguments is of primary importance. Besides, we can
eliminate this problem by setting all thresholds to the same value. Note that
we have chosen to set κτi± to nil when τ(i) changes. We could have kept the
overhaul to indicate which penchant we were on.
Example
To try and make the above discussion clearer, we will consider a simple situation
and look at its consequences. Suppose first of all that we will be using L5 to judge
the truth degrees. Table 1 gives the interpretations associated with each degree
for the likelihood of an information and for the trustworthiness of any source.
Now suppose we have two different readers, as in table 2 and in figure 2, who
will be rating the same flow of information, specified in table 3.
What we mean by a flow of information is a time-ordered list of information/source-
rating pairs. To keep things handy, we will only list related informations, i.e.
pieces of information either confirming or contradicting the original one.
Table 3 shows the flow of incoming information and also the consequential
evolution of both user’s rating. If User 1 is balanced and regular, he should
not necessarily be seen as exceedingly trusting. Indeed he will only trust one
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Likelihood Degree Trustworthiness
Totally unlikely τ0 Absolutely untrustworthy
Rather unlikely τ1 Rather untrustworthy
Possible τ2 Possibly trustworthy
Rather likely τ3 Quite trustworthy
Extremely likely τ4 Completely trustworthy
Table 1. An example of possible truth-values in L5
User 1 User 2
↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
κτ1τ0 τ3 κ
τ0
τ1 τ3 κ
τ1
τ0 τ4 κ
τ0
τ1 τ2
κτ2τ1 τ3 κ
τ1
τ2 τ3 κ
τ2
τ1 τ3 κ
τ1
τ2 τ2
κτ3τ2 τ3 κ
τ2
τ3 τ3 κ
τ3
τ2 τ2 κ
τ2
τ3 τ1
κτ4τ3 τ3 κ
τ3
τ4 τ3 κ
τ4
τ3 τ3 κ
τ3
τ4 τ1
Table 2. Two different perspectives on persuasion
User 1 User 2
τ2 τ3τ1τ0 τ4
i /∈ K
τ2 τ3τ1τ0 τ4
i /∈ K
τ3 τ3 τ3 τ3
τ3τ3τ3τ3
τ2
τ2τ2τ2
τ1
τ3 τ3τ4
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of our two users, described in table 2
Information
Source
Trustworthiness
User 1 User 2
τ(i) κτi+ κτi− τ(i) κτi+ κτi−
i τ1 τ2 τ1 - τ2 τ1 -
¬i τ2 τ2 τ1 τ2 τ1 - -
i τ2 τ3 - - τ1 τ2 -
¬i τ2 τ3 - τ2 τ0 - -
i τ3 τ4 - - τ0 τ3 -
¬i τ2 τ4 - τ2 τ0 τ3 τ2
Table 3. A conflicting flow of information, the first line denoting the initial entry of
the knowledge, the others either confirming it (i) or contradicting it (¬i)
source if it is rated as ‘quite trustworthy’. User 2, on the other hand, is rather
mistrustful. Not only is he hard to convince, but changes of hearts will, in general,
not be received very well. This simplified example was, obviously, constructed
to enhance our point of view that different settings reflect different attitudes
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towards trust. Yet we are convinced that in a more general context the same
differences would be noted.
So, where Mendel and John [8] see the fuzzyfying of membership functions
as an opportunity to allow for noise in the model, we think that our sort higher
type multi-valued formalism may allow for different perceptions on the evolution
of the truth-degrees.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have used a multi-valued formalism to qualify both our belief
in an information and in its source. We have used the latter to moderate the
former’s evolution. In so doing, we have constructed a qualitative estimation of
the truth value, hence added some lattitude to model uncertain processes. We
have shown that different cognitive stands may be represented using this added
degree of freedom.
In future works, we would like to investigate further in matters of comparison.
Our model supposes that information are either unrelated or totally comparable.
We think that it would benefit from the inclusion of a degree of similarity between
compared objects. We would also like to work further on multi-valued scales. We
think that, with all their convenient properties, they might benefit from being
relaxed somewhat.
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